Seven Lessons We Can Learn From Clinton's Faltering Candidacy

Some are declaring this to be the beginning, or even, the middle of the end for Hillary. But what can we learn from Hillary's rise and fall?

Photo by Valentina Powers. (License: Creative Commons Attribution)

As the race for the Democratic nomination marches forward, a debate still rages among Democrats as to who the "better candidate" is, and what criteria we should use for assessing quality. What the last two weeks has demonstrated, in a striking fashion, is that many of the assumptions being made about how to run a campaign need to be reevaluated. The argument I'd like to make is, essentially, that setting aside all other considerations, Obama is running a much better campaign than Clinton is.

While some degree of Obama's success can certainly be credited to his personal strengths (such as his skill as an orator), I believe a larger share of credit is owed to the way his campaign is structured, and how it has approached the nomination. All other things being equal, it seems clear to me that if voters need to choose which campaign machinery to use in the general election, it's Obama's.

While I've been an Obama supporter for some time (since Edwards dropped out of the race), I think there's a strong, objective case to be made that it is Obama, and not Clinton, who has set a new standard for how to succeed in American politics. By examining Clinton's failures (and Obama's successes) in seeking the nomination, we can derive some conclusions that will serve any candidate well.

1. Start Positive, Stay Positive

The conventional wisdom is that a candidate should "go negative" in order to throw their opponent off balance and damage their image. The reality, of course, is that negative campaigning hurts both the target and the attacker, but the conventional wisdom says that there's a "right" way to go negative that does more damage to your foes than to yourself: a "net profit," if you will. Since the 80s, politicians have relied on this negativity so heavily that we, as voters, now take it for granted.

Obama's campaign has managed, for the most part, to remain astonishingly positive in this often-hostile political climate. Perhaps more surprisingly, he has sought to spin a positive image since the very beginning. This isn't to say that he hasn't been critical, but the overall tone of Obama's campaign has consistently been more upbeat than Clinton's. Obama has been careful to be critical of policy without being critical of character. Clinton, on the other hand, has followed the classic Rove maneuver: trying to spin your opponent's greatest strength into a weakness. This kind of tactic is necessarily negative, especially given that Obama's greatest strength (most agree) is speaking from the stump. Despite being trying to sell herself as the "policy candidate," Clinton has wasted a lot of time trying to throw mud at Obama's pep-rally speeches, and so long as Obama doesn't respond in kind, she seems to be mostly damaging herself by doing so.

But staying positive is more than what you talk about. For over a decade, Republicans have held most of the cards in the Branding War. Republicans have known for years how to sell their ideas in voter-friendly, positive terms, consistently outdoing the Democratic establishment in branding their ideology (such as the "Clean Air Act." Who could possibly be against clean air?). Now, Obama is using the same strategy against the same party establishment, to great success. In the early days of the campaign, Obama appropriated "Hope," "Change," and even the unquestionably positive "Yes We Can." A candidate hoping to run against these incredibly general, incredibly vague concepts must either (a) embrace them and ride Obama's coattails or (b) be against "Hope" and "Change." Obama has stayed "on message" by staying positive, which improves the strength of his campaign even further. In contrast, Clinton has oscillated between claiming she's the real change candidate ("a") and attacking Obama for being naive ("b").

2. Keep Your Message As Simple As Possible

Obama has received a lot of flack for running his campaign on hopes and dreams instead of running it on concrete policy proposals. Clinton continues to attack Obama for being insubstantial. The problem is that while everyone knows what Obama stands for (even if it seems vague and simplistic), no one knows precisely what Clinton is running on apart from "experience," and that her purported substance hasn't really registered with voters. They, for the most part, take her substance on faith, if they do at all. The fact is that Americans want a message that is simple enough to be understood, even if that message is too vague to translate into policy.

Again, the Republicans have paved the way in this regard. The lesson the Democrats should have taken from the 2004 election is that Americans don't respond well to an ivory-tower intellectual who seems to speak down to them with a graduate-level vocabulary. Bush (an ivory-tower graduate himself) was self-effacing and almost purposefully inarticulate in contrast to Kerry's wordy delivery. Clinton is cut from much the same cloth as Kerry: she seems to revel in the skunkworks of politics, getting her hands dirty tinkering in policy. This has left her at a disadvantage in conveying a consistent theme to her campaign. Analysts often joke about Clinton "rebranding" herself every week, and this stems largely from her having a constantly-shifting message that doesn't boil down to a simple theme.

The critical thing about this piece of advice is "as simple as possible," i.e. don't oversimplify. As criticisms mounted that Obama's campaign lacked substance, Obama obliged by increasing his discussion of policy and by moving away from his most-often-repeated catch-phrases. He did so gradually, without altering his general style or delivery, and most people didn't really notice the transition. In this game, a sense of timing is very important, and Obama has been careful not to make abrupt changes to his message. This has made Clinton's hairpin turns even more obvious.

3. Anyone Who Aims For A Narrow Victory Should Prepare For A Narrow Defeat

The Clinton campaign's basic thinking about the campaign has, at its root, the philosophy of "50% + 1." From the beginning, it has aimed for "just enough" to secure victory. For example, in the leadup to Super Tuesday, Clinton only bought air time in 12 states; Obama, by contrast, bought air time in 20 states, leaving only Illinois (where his victory was assured) and Oklahoma (where his defeat was assured) untargeted. In many ways, Obama embodies the "50 State Strategy" that Howard Dean pushed to great success in the 2006 elections: Obama wants to win everywhere by as wide a margin as possible. In other words, a mild victory isn't good enough for Obama's campaign, and his pursuit of every ally he can find (even in deeply red states like Utah) has hugely improved his apparent viability.

Obviously, winning everywhere is not realistic. But Clinton's campaign has made the crucial mistake of doing what, really, is the bare minimum. In some states, Clinton never even appeared publicly, a move that many feel hurt her margins of victory considerably. By aiming for only the minimum needed to win, Clinton has, in effect, left the rear gate open for Obama to approach voters and say "others see you as irrelevant, but I want all of you on board." The results have surprised even seasoned pollsters, who are discovering that their demographics for "likely voters" are failing to anticipate the magnitude of the Obama landslides we've seen over the last two weeks. Pollsters gave Obama a nine point margin in Wisconsin, for example, but Obama doubled that, winning 58% to 40%.

One possible result of this wave of support in much the country is once "safe" Republican states are increasingly looking like they'll be in play. In this regard, Obama's ambitious pursuit of every last vote isn't overspending: it's an investment in the general election. If Republicans are forced to fight a grassroots Democratic insurgency in their own back yards, they'll be hard pressed to put their full weight on the big swing states. In this regard, Obama's successes are without question a boon to Democrats. Clinton's cynicism about the Red/Blue divide, by contrast, isn't as likely to inspire voters in swing states, or pull any new states into the 'swing' category.

4. You Can Run A Shoestring, Grassroots Budget On A Massive Scale

There simply isn't any question that Obama's campaign is a fundraising powerhouse. He has shattered previous primary records and left his opponent, the candidate who ostensibly has all the connection, in the dust. What is perhaps more impressive, however, is that Obama has done this without relying heavily on big-donor handouts and without developing the "campaign bloat" that can cause money to be wasted on luxuries.

It is instructive, for example, that throughout the weeks since Super Tuesday, Hillary has run several upscale fundraising events to "feed the beast," keeping her campaign afloat by soliciting large donations either personally or through her husband. While the payoff of this sort of fundraising can be sizable, there is a big cost: time. Every evening Hillary or Bill loses by hobnobbing with the upper crust is an evening Obama can make a more public and more down-to-earth appearance. There's no question that both campaigns are spending money like water and are getting big donations, but Obama's fundraising methodology is far better at keeping him to he does best: give speeches.

Part of what has made Obama as effective as he has been is that Obama isn't just soliticing funds, but offering "ownership" of the campaign. People are more likely to give you money (especially small amounts of money) if they feel they have an emotional investment. "Sponsor a child" charities have understood this for a generation, and Obama's message resonates with a public that feels it's been kept out of the political loop for a long time. Clinton's message has been "If you get me there, I'll come back with results," while Obama's message has been "Come join me and we'll get results together." Which message is an 'easier sell' should be obvious to everyone.

5. An Air Game Won't Beat A Ground Game In A Prolonged Conflict

It's true in military occupations and it's true in politics: you can't win by air power (or, in this case, airwave power) alone. Obama's campaign has opened more offices in more places, and did so far earlier than Clinton did. The result is that, for some time now, Obama's had a superior ground game, and this has given him an edge in primaries and a devastating advantage in caucuses.

It's often said that you can't manufacture a grassroots campaign, and this remains true. What Obama has done, effectively, is to ship passionate organizers all over the country and allowed them the freedom to build a grassroots movement of their own on a tiny budget. Here, again, the sense of "ownership" in the campaign is palpable. In some cases, of course, that ownership can become overwhelming (or, as many have described it, "cult-like"), and Obama's campaign must work to keep its various supporters in check, but a campaign that has to ask it's supporters to settle down is in a much better place than a campaign that has to ask its supporters to liven up. Furthermore, by going for a low-cost, decentralized model, Obama can afford to have many official or semi-official organizers nationwide. This results in more "bang" for your buck, and Obama's put a lot of bucks into this kind of organizing.

Without question, the battle for the airwaves remains a crucial part of a successful campaign, and my advice is not to ignore the air game. But your air game should support your volunteers on the ground, rather than your volunteers acting as support for your ad campaign. Faced with heavy advertising, voters are more inclined to the candidate who actually seems to have real support (and thus real involvement) at a local level.

6. Momentum Matters

After Giuliani self-destructed in Florida, you'd think other "long-time frontrunners" would have taken to heart the lesson that the rest of the political world has known all along: momentum is tremendously important. The key, here, is that momentum and expectation form a synergy: a candidate who exceeds expectation gets a boost, and candidates who are being boosted exceed expectation.

What Obama's campaign has demonstrated masterfully is how to aim high and then overshoot the mark. Clinton's campaign tried to do some preventative damage control early on by saying "we're going to lose a few, but don't worry about it." What they didn't prepare their supports for was a series of crushing defeats by wide margins, even in areas that polled heavily in Clinton's favor during late January and early February. This set up an expectation that Obama would keep winning big, and the voters went along with the conventional wisdom. Result: big wins.

The reasoning behind momentum is something of a tautology, admittedly, but it's not a phenomenon that can be dismissed. The lesson here is that every victory, no matter how small, should be celebrated, and any angle a candidate can take that maximized how surprising their victory is should be exploited. If you can't expect any big victories, you should try to make some victories by setting up a contrary expectations and then immediately outperforming them. A voter who is alarmed that their candidate might lose is motivated to act (vote, donate, etc.) out of a sense of alarm. A voter who is being told that their candidate has lost has their motivation diminished because most people don't want to side with a loser.

7. Hone Your Reflexes

The single area where Obama has surprised me most is in his campaign's ability to react instantly to the news cycle. The moment a news story hits the associated press (a sure sign it will be hitting the general media minutes or hours later), Obama's campaign goes into gear and has a response ready almost at once. Clinton's campaign, by contrast, responds to most scandals by withdrawing from the conflict, often appearing indecisive. This has been most widely discussed in the context of Bill's remarks in South Carolina, following which he was kept away from the media. In effect, the message the Clinton campaign gave off was to recognize that they had been unwise, but not to apologize.

The reflexes of Obama's campaign probably stems from two sources: its decentralized nature and its reliance on gut feelings. Regarding the first, a campaign in which the various components can act with some degree of autonomy isn't shackled to word-from-on-high: it can react at once. Regarding the second, Clinton's team seems to many to rely too heavily on "vetting" its responses with their (expensive) consultants. Both Obama and his wife have, on more than one occasion, spoken off the cuff and said things that got them in mild trouble, and in in every case, their reaction to the scandal has seemed natural. Because Obama's campaign doesn't rely on marketing techniques to address every problem, it can act more quickly and more naturally, even if the result is slightly more gaffs.

For some time now, America has been demonstrating, in election after election, that it wants a "straight shooter" who speaks their mind, even if that means the occasional mistake. Having your campaign structured in such a way that you can respond to scandals with near-spontaneity helps convey that sense of honest integrity, and the longer you delay reacting, the more your integrity can be called into question.

Final Thoughts

Despite my support for Obama, I don't see the candidates as being terribly different. While Obama is certainly more of an idealist and Clinton is certainly more ruthless, they'll likely pursue the same policies once they're in office and be forced to make the same compromises. I happen to think that Obama has a better chance of bringing moderates and conservatives to the table to see his policies enacted, but I respect those who disagree with me.

But before we, as Democrats, discuss who would be the best president, we must seriously consider who would be the best candidate. We should vote not just with our hearts but also with our minds, thinking seriously about who has the team, the support structure, and the approach that best guarantees victory. In my opinion, Obama's meteoric rise from underdog to frontrunner demonstrates that even when the odds are against him, he is a very effective competitor who knows how to get maximal value out of his organization.

I also think how the candidates run their campaigns says a lot about the kind of presidency they would have. Clinton's approach is the insider track: getting the superdelegates and the bare minimum of voters, which doesn't bode well if you believe in transparency or citizen involvement. Her fundraising is also far more secretive, and recent news that "independent support groups" (read: Swiftboaters) are forming to support Clinton smells strongly of the nasty politics of yesteryear. And then there's the documents she hasn't given voters access to, such as the internal documents from her time as First Lady that would shed light on her purported credentials on healthcare. Perhaps more generally, Clinton's campaign seems to take the voters for granted, instead of reaching out to them.

These things do not inspire trust in me. While Obama is not by any means a "transparent" candidate, he has demonstrated considerably more transparency than Clinton, and seems (from his campaign and from his legislative history) genuinely interested in bipartisan dialog, which I also support.

But even if these things were equal, Obama remains the superior campaigner. And this alone recommends him as the nominee to win the whole deal.

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